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Overview
¨ Introduction and Background
¨ Demand for MRAPs
¨MRAP Description
¨MRAP Procurement




¨ The largest military industrial mobilization since 
WWII
¨ The most significant example of urgent government-
industry cooperation on a massive scale since WWII
¨ DoD’s #1 acquisition program (per SecDef Gates, 
May 07) 
“The MRAP program was the first major defense procurement program
to go from concept to full-scale production in less than a year since 




¨ Improvised Explosive Devices 
(IEDs)
– Approximately 70 percent of troop 
casualties
– Increasing frequency--“Beginning in 
June 2003, IED incidents targeting 
coalition forces began to escalate from 
22 per month to over 600 per month 
in June 2004. In June 2006, these 
incidents reached more than 2,000 per 
month. At one point in 2006, coalition 
forces in Iraq were experiencing 
almost 100 IEDs per day” – GAO, 
2009
– Evolving sophistication







Video is courtesy of a combat-disabled US Army "Silent Professional"
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Initial Two Prong Approach
¨ Avoidance tactics and defeating insurgents’ ability to make and 
detonate IEDs
– In October 2003, a small Army unit dedicated itself to studying IED avoidance 
tactics and defeating insurgents’ ability to make and detonate IEDs.  
• Unit elevated the to a joint task force in 2004, became a permanent entity in February 
2006.
• In FY2007, JIEDDO employed hundreds of people and commanded a budget over $4 
billion. 
¨ Adding armor to HMMWVs
– In the summer of 2003, DoD also began procuring up-armored HMMWVs
(identified as the M1114), as well as adding armor kits to existing vehicles.  
• congressional pressure and media exposure spurred a significant ramp-up in production 
• Add-on kits or new, up-armored models
• Already in production
• Flat bottoms absorb a great deal of blast force
• Marginal improvements in survivability over HMMWV, but, at the same time, insurgent  
attacks increase in 





– a family of vehicles that incorporate 
a V-shaped, armored hull that 
directs blast away from crew
– High ground clearance dissipates 
blast intensity
– Heavily armored
¨ Not a new Concept
– South Africa deployed the first 





¨ U.S. began testing MRAP vehicles in FY 2000
– A few dozen were in service in Iraq and Afghanistan prior to the
MRAP program
– Viewed as a niche capability for EOD teams, rather than as 
replacement for the HMMWV 
– Demonstrated superior survivability
¨ Vehicle Loss Rates Attributable to Mines 
Conflict  Loss rate (%)
World War II 23
Korea 56
Vietnam 70
Operation Desert Storm 59





¨ Field demand for better-armored vehicles began, as 
IEDs emerged as a major threats, shortly drive into 
Baghdad 2003  
– Interest beyond EOD teams, from regular combat forces to 
replace HMMWVs on certain missions
– For example, a Military Police Commander issued an 
urgent request for armored security vehicles in June 2003, 
to better protect U.S. convoys in Iraq 
– Also,  latter that summer 101st Army Airborne Division 





¨ First formal field request – Urgent Universal Need Statement 
(UUNS) from Deputy Commanding General, I Marine 
Expeditionary Force came February 17, 2005 
– Request for 1,169 MRAPs routed to the USMC in-house rapid 
acquisition process
¨ MCCDC stops processing request in light of Commandant's 
decision to replace all HMMWVs with up-armored HMMWVs
¨ Demand continued, and manifested as a Joint Universal 
Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) in joint-service channels
– May 2006: Commanding General, Multi-National Force – West 
issues a Joint Staff Rapid Validation and Resourcing Request for 185 
MRAPs
– July 2006: An additional 1000 MRAPs requested
– November 2006: First contract signed for MRAP production
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Why the ‘Delay’ in the Requirements Process?
¨ Nearly two years (20 months) passed from the time of the first 
formal field request for MRAPs, until validated requirements 
were obtained
¨ Speculation on DoD’s thinking:
– Threatened programs of record, e.g. MRAPs would divert funding 
away from existing development programs such as the Joint Light 
Tactical Vehicle (JLTV)
– Enemy constantly adapting faster than MRAPs or other solutions 
(up armored HMMWVs) could be fielded and updated
– Incongruent with envisioned light, expeditionary force structure
– Counter to counter-insurgency strategy
– Casualty rates not historically high
– Belief in a short war




Category I Category II
 Intended for urban combat 
environments and patrols  
 Transports up to 6 personnel 
 Curb weight 7 – 15 tons
 Estimated per unit cost range: 
$300,000 to $550,000*  
 Intended for convoy escort, 
troop/cargo transport, explosive 
ordinance disposal and ambulance 
missions 
 Transports up to 10 personnel
 Curb weight 15-25 tons






 Used primarily for route clearance 
and explosive ordinance disposal
 Transports up to 13 personnel 
 Curb weight 25 tons
 Estimated unit cost: $856,000*
 Only FPI’s 6x6 Buffalo was 
awarded production in this category, 
 And, only the USMC acquired 




*These estimates are for the base model.  Modifications, to include armor upgrades, 
increased the costs.  The accepted estimate is that average cost for MRAPs is approximately 
$1 million per vehicle.
And we’re off
¨ Aug 2006 - RFI to industry
¨ Initial requirement validated Oct ‘06 for 1,185
– Requirements would escalate to over 16,000 MRAPs and 
6,600 M-ATVs by Oct ‘09
¨ Nov 2006 – RFP released
– Minimum set of performance standards
¨ Nov 2006 – Sole Source production contract signed 
for Cat II and III 
– already in production by Force Protection Industries (FPI)




¨ Ten manufacturers responded to the RFP
¨ The proposals were evaluated based on technical approach and 
proposed delivery schedule. 
¨ Nine contractors were awarded firm-fixed-price IDIQ contracts
– Up to 1500 Cat I, and 2600 Cat II MRAPs per year (one year and four 
option years) 
¨ Also required the nine vendors to supply 2 vehicles in each category 
(I and II) for survivability and mobility testing.  
– These 36 test vehicles cost $88 million.
¨ LRIP orders immediately to 5 manufacturers on the basis of risk in 
their proposals
– Allowed industry to ramp-up
– The entire program would essentially run on LRIPs









¨ Congress gave the program everything 
it requested, it even appropriated funds 
in excess of requests
¨ Through FY2009, $26.8B in wartime 
supplementals and reprogramming --
to procure over 16,000 MRAP vehicles
¨ Supplemental funding had no “color.”
– A component critical was a transfer 
fund set up by the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD)
– Allowed the Joint Program Office to 
decide how to color money by type 
and service.
Priming the Industrial Pump
¨ DX rating
¨ Funded manufacturer facility 
upgrades
¨ Tire shortage
– Paid for additional molds for 
Michelin
– Certified Goodyear tires
¨ Steel shortage
– Dropped import restrictions
– Qualified more steel makers





¨ Concurrent testing, 
production modification, 
and fielding
– New orders placed after 
each round of testing
– Continuous improvement
¨Manufacturer reps on site 
at Aberdeen
– Immediate feedback to 
production and design 
teams
GFE and Transport
¨ All GFE installed at SPAWAR
¨ Air-shipped until capacity 
reached
– Roughly half of all MRAPs
– Approximately $160,000 per 
vehicle
¨ Surface (Sea) shipments
– Approximately $20,000





¨With the initial requirement (below 1,700 vehicles), 
the program planned for contractor logistics support.  
¨ As the requirements dramatically increased, the Army 
planned to transition to an organic approach
¨ Currently employing a hybrid strategy
¨ The program office also required the contractor’s field 
service representatives to be able to maintain the other 
manufacturers’ MRAPs
– This provided significant flexibility in-theater 
¨ As of November 2009, fleet readiness was 97% in Iraq 







¨ Poor maneuverability makes it difficult, sometimes impossible to
use in an urban environment
¨ Poor off-road performance
¨ Prone to tipping
¨ 70% of world’s bridges can’t hold MRAPs
¨ Too wide for many roads
¨ High fuel consumption—approximately 3 mpg
¨ Can only be airlifted by U.S. Air Force’s C-17 and C-5, and 
Russia’s AN-124






The Most Survivable Vehicle
¨ MRAPs can reduce IED casualties by 80%
– Commandant of the Marine Corps
¨ 4 to 5 times safer than up-armored HMMWV
– Asst. Commandant of the Marine Corps
¨ Casualty Rates:
– MRAPs: 6%
– Abrams tank: 15%
– Up-armored HMMWV: 22%
“MRAPs have proven time and time again to save the lives and limbs of 
soldiers and Marines … and I think they’re worth every dime the taxpayers 
are spending on them” - Secretary of Defense Gates (Scully 2009)
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Lessons Learned & Recommendations
Leadership
¨ Champions—enjoyed the unwavering support of the SECDEF and 
Congress 
¨ MRAP Task Force—all relevant decision-makers met weekly to solve 
problem in real-time
¨ Unity of message/purpose—once the decision was made, there was clear 
agreement by all stakeholders that the goal was to field as many
survivable vehicles as possible as quickly as possible.
Recommendations
¨ Assign senior-level champions to ensure that the program keeps moving 
through the acquisition process.
¨ Constantly reinforce the priorities of the project and expectations
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Lessons Learned & Recommendations
Requirements and Acquisition Processes
¨ Rapid acquisitions need not be linear
– Tailored acquisition approach
¨ Inadequacy of current acquisition system for rapid acquisitions
– Ad hoc organizations
– Must work within the deliberate acquisition system
¨ Supplemental Funding
Recommendations
¨ Allow flexibility in timing of paperwork and process
¨ Create a separate rapid acquisitions agency
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Lessons Learned & Recommendations
Production
¨ Priming the industrial base
– Industry leaned forward buying material at risk, in advance of orders at their 
own 
– DoD awarded LRIP contracts to all low-risk manufacturers even before testing 
was underway
– DoD provided funding to upgrade facilities and equipment
¨ Securing scarce resources—steel and tires were the limiting factor
¨ Used existing technology, with continuous refinement and competition
¨ Manufacturers embedded at test center
¨ Open to outside solutions—minimum performance requirements were set
¨ Willingness to take reasonable risks
Recommendation
¨ Encourage the appropriate level of risk tolerance




¨ The level of effort and flexibility of everyone involved – from 
the program office, to the manufacturers, to SPAWAR – made 
the rapid fielding of MRAPs possible and absolutely saved 
lives
¨ The program has also shown what is possible in scale and 
scope when enormous political will and (nearly unlimited) 
funding are brought to bear on the existing military 
procurement system  
¨ Succeeded despite having to work within the existing 
acquisition system  
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